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The provision and public dissemination of information about health hazards has become 
an increasingly important part of state and federal programs designed to manage environmental 
and health risks.  Examples include the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxics 
Release Inventory, the US Food and Drug Administration’s fish advisories, and California’s 
‘smog alerts’ program.  The central idea behind each of these programs is that the provision of 
information allows the public to engage in behavioral responses to minimize exposure should the 
costs of that exposure exceed its benefits.  Whether such information is a substitute or 
complement to environmental standards is an open question.  In either case, understanding 
responses to such informational approaches is critical for determining both the costs and the 
effectiveness of these programs. 
One important area where informational approaches play a key role is in the management 
of drinking water quality.  The EPA, under the auspices of the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), places strict limits on roughly 90 chemicals or contaminants in community drinking 
water systems, which is accessed by nearly 270 million people in the United States.  Despite 
these limits, roughly one in ten Americans is served by a drinking water system that exceeds 
these limits on at least one dimension (Duhigg, 2009).  Such violations must be disclosed to 
consumers under the SDWA Amendments of 1996.  This paper examines avoidance behavior in 
response to these disclosures regarding drinking water violations. 
Matching geocoded violations data for Northern California and Nevada from 2001-2005 
with sales data from a major supermarket chain, we estimate the change in bottled water 2 
 
purchases as a result of tap water violations.  Since the behavioral response in this case is a 
market-based one, it is straightforward to calculate the costs of avoidance behavior.  We find a 
statistically significant increase in bottled water sales of 22 percent from violations due to 
microorganisms and 17 percent from violations due to elements and chemicals.
1  Combining 
these store-level estimates from Northern California and Nevada with national sales data on 
bottled water consumption, we compute back-of-the-envelope costs of avoidance behavior at 
roughly $60 million for all violations in 2005, noting this figure likely reflects a significant 
understatement of the total costs of avoidance behavior, and thus willingness to pay to eliminate 
violations. 
I. Data  
  The SDWA Amendments of 1996 require 150,000 community water districts (CWDs) 
throughout the US to actively monitor contaminants levels.  If contaminants exceed maximum 
contaminant level (MCL) standards, a CWD must notify the EPA of the violation and adhere to 
the Public Notification Rule.  This rule requires CWDs to notify customers within 24-hours if the 
responsible contaminant poses an immediate health threat (primarily microorganisms and 
nitrates) and within 30 days for other health threats.  CWDs must notify customers through 
various social media outlets, posting in public places, and personal delivery.  Relevant for our 
analysis, these notifications must include a description of the violation and potential health 
effects, the population at risk, actions consumers can take, when the violation occurred, when a 




1 Nitrates and nitrites violations result in reductions of similar magnitude, but are not statistically significant. 
2 Unfortunately for our analysis, we do not have data on the exact details of the notification provided by districts. 3 
 
The Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) maintained by the EPA contains 
detailed records of all violations. After filing a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained 
historical information on all violations that occurred in the US from 2001-2005.  These data 
include the start and end date of the violation, the contaminant responsible for the violation, as 
well as characteristics about the CWD, including the county and population served.  We 
contacted all water districts in California and Nevada that serve at least 100 people and obtain 
the zip codes they serve.  If a water district serves more than one zip code, we split the 
population served between zip codes based on their overall population.  For example, if a water 
district serves customers in two zip codes, where zip code 1 has twice the population of zip code 
2, we assigned two-thirds of the population served to zip code 1 and one-third to zip code 2. 
We combine individual violations into three broadly defined groups based on their 
potential health effects, which is also consistent with the public notification rule.  
“Microorganisms” pose immediate gastrointestinal health threats to all individuals; this largely 
consists of coliform bacteria and can be removed by boiling tap water. “Nitrates” pose 
immediate threat of “blue-baby syndrome” to infants and can not be removed by boiling. 
“Elements/chemicals,” which includes natural occurring elements, such as arsenic, 
manufacturing chemicals, such as tetrachloroethylene, and disinfection byproducts from 
removing microorganisms, also can not be removed by boiling.  The health effects from 
elements/chemicals, which include cancer and toxicity to various organs, typically arise from 
longer-term exposure and do not require immediate notification.  Table 1 displays the number of 
violations for each group along with the mean duration of each violation for both the US and our 
final sample for the years 2001-2005. 
Our data on bottled water consumption uses weekly sales (Wednesday-Tuesday) from a 4 
 
national grocery chain for their stores in Northern California and Nevada for weeks starting 
October 31, 2001 until November 2, 2005.  The data includes sales in dollars as well as quantity 
sold for 308 Universal Product Codes (UPC).  These UPCs cover still water (e.g., Aquafina, 
Dasani), sparkling water (e.g., Pellegrino, Perrier), and flavored sparkling water (e.g., Calistoga 
lemon flavored sparkling water).  Different sizes of the same product (e.g., 16oz versus 1 gallon) 
have distinct UPCs, although the size of a bottle is unfortunately not identified in the UPC 
database for most codes.  Aggregating quantities is complicated by the fact that an increase in 
demand might be met by switching from smaller to larger bottles while holding the number of 
units sold constant.  Thus, we aggregate sales in dollars for all 308 UPCs by store and week as 
our dependent variable.  
Store level sales were linked to water violations by matching water districts with stores 
that are located in the zip code that is served by the district.  Our baseline model uses zip-codes, 
and not a distance measure, to match water districts to zip codes.  Such an algorithm better 
captures the relevant customer base of a store because zip codes are much larger in rural areas 
and customers may drive further to reach a store than customers in urban areas.   
Table 2 displays community characteristics by violation frequency.  We define “high 
(low) violations” as being above (below) the median number of violations for the time period 
studied.  In areas with more violations, residents on average consume less bottled water and 
come from lower socio-economic status (SES).  This pattern is consistent with poorer provision 
of public goods in lower SES areas and that bottled water consumption is a normal good.  Both 
indicate the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of violations. 
II. Methods  
In a standard utility maximization setup, we can think of the demand for bottled water as 5 
 
a function of the price of bottled water, the price of tap water, the price of substitutes (all quality-
adjusted), income, and both time-varying and time-invariant individual preferences.  If a 
violation occurs, the quality-adjusted price of tap water increases, thus increasing the demand for 
bottled water. 
We empirically model this relationship between violations and bottled water sales 
according to the following specification: 
(1)  yswt = β1 + β2*violationswt*(popwz/popz) + β3*weatherswt + αsw + δt + εswt  
where y is log(weekly sales of bottled water) at store s in water district w (both located in zip 
code z) in week t. The fraction of time a store-water district combination was in violation for 
each of the three types of violations in week t is captured by the vector violation.  We multiply 
this by popwz/popz, the estimated fraction of the population in zip code z that is served by water 
district w, since not all customers in a zip code are faced with a violation.  This provides a 
measure of the zip code exposure to violations, and enables us to interpret β2 as the percentage 
change in sales at each store from a violation affecting all people in the zip code.  Controls for 
weekly mean  maximum and minimum temperature and total precipitation, which account for 
potential time-varying preferences for bottled water, are included in weather.  Store-water 
district fixed effects αsw capture time-invariant factors that affect the demand for bottled water, 
such as income and personal preferences.  Temporal and seasonal trends in bottled water 
consumption are accounted for by year-week fixed effects δt.  Finally, εswt is an error term that 
consists of a store specific term, a water district specific term, and an i.i.d. component. This 
multi-cluster approach allows for arbitrary serial correlation in sales within stores and for 
correlation between multiple zip codes served by one water district (Cameron, Gelbach and 
Miller, 2011).  6 
 
Although we do not include prices in this econometric model, we contend that prices are 
unlikely to change in response to local water warnings.  Prices are set weekly by a centralized 
marketing department of the grocery chain, and hence are unlikely to incorporate local 
conditions. Using data from the same chain, Schlenker and Villas-Boas (2009) found negligible 
changes in beef prices when Mad Cow disease resulted in drops of meat purchases by 20 percent.  
Changes in beef consumption were observed at all stores and hence a coordinated price response 
would have been much easier than store-specific responses to local shocks in water demand.  
Nonetheless, we create a price index at the store-week level to approximate local prices, and both 
use it as an independent and dependent variable in our estimation of equation (1).
3 
III. Results  
Panel A of Table 3 presents our main results.  Column 1 shows cross-sectional 
correlations, which should be interpreted with caution because violation frequency is correlated 
with other determinants of bottled-water consumption (as shown in Table 2).  Accordingly, we 
do not find a statistically significant response to water quality violations, with coefficients on 
two of the violations having counterintuitive signs.  Column 2, which includes store-water 
district fixed effects, indicates that controlling for the endogeneity of violations is essential.  We 
obtain a 22 percent increase in bottled water sales from a microorganism violation, a 26 percent 
increase in response to nitrate violations, and a 17 percent increase from an element/chemical 
violation, with only the nitrate violation not statistically significantly different from zero.  A 
larger response to microorganisms and nitrates is consistent with differences in reporting 
requirements (i.e., within 24 hours), though these differences are not statistically significant. 
                                                            
3 We computed the price index as follows: 1) calculate the total quantity sold for each UPC-store combination; 2) 
calculate price level: price (at store-UPC-week) divided by average price (store-UPC); and 3) take the weighted 
average of price levels in (2) using the fixed basket of (1) as weights. 7 
 
In Panel B, we explore the potential impact of violations on the price of bottled water 
using our created price index.  In both the cross-sectional and fixed effects regressions, we do not 
find a statistically significant relationship between violations and prices, suggesting that local 
grocery stores did not change prices in response to the surge in demand from water quality 
violations.  We also included the price index as an explanatory variable in a revised sales 
regression (not shown), and the violation coefficients remain unchanged.
4 
Heterogeneous responses to these violations may arise for at least two reasons: 1) more 
vulnerable individuals will have greater incentives to respond to violations to which they have a 
greater sensitivity; and 2) more forward looking individuals will be more responsive to violations 
that generate negative health consequence far into the future.   As crude proxies for these, we 
separately include violations interacted with three Census measures of the zip code that a water 
district serves: median household income, the percent of population under age 5, and the percent 
of population over age 65.  Table 4 shows the estimated responses to each type of violation for 
the bottom and top quartile of the zip code characteristic, along with a p-value from a t-test for 
whether the responses are the same across the two quartiles.
5   We find a greater response to 
microorganisms in communities with a larger elderly population, which is consistent with a 
greater response by vulnerable populations.  However, we do not find a corresponding increase 
for communities with more young children.  Consistent with element/chemical violations posing 
longer term health risks, we find that communities with wealthier households and a smaller 
number of individuals over age 65 had a larger response.  We find no support for a differential 
                                                            
4 We also explore several other alternative specifications, such as controlling for county-specific seasonality, and 
found our results to be generally robust to these alternatives.  Our baseline regression in column 1 does not include 
price since it may be endogenous. 
5 We dropped the results showing interactions with percent under age 5 from Table 4 because all interaction terms 
were statistically insignificant (results are available upon request). 8 
 
response to nitrates/nitrates, perhaps because they only pose a risk to bottle fed children that may 
not be well captured by our simple measure of child exposure in each zip code.    
A considerable advantage from using bottled water sales as a measure of avoidance 
behavior is that it reflects a market-based activity that can be used to provide estimates of the 
cost of avoidance behavior.  We perform the following back-of-the-envelope calculation to 
provide estimates of total expenditures on bottled water sales in the US from all violations in 
2005: 
(2) Total  costs  =       
ct
c wc cwt ct pop pop violation sales ) / ( ˆ
2   
where 2 ˆ   is the adjusted estimated coefficient from model (1).
6  Salesct are interpolated sales on 
week t in county c, where we distribute the yearly US total in 2005 of $14.9 billion 
(Datamonitor, 2005) evenly among all 52 weeks of the year, and then distribute the weekly sales 
volume across counties based on population.  The fraction of days in week t that a violation 
occurred in each water district in each county for each of the types of violations is measured by 
violationcwt. Finally, popwc/popc is the estimated fraction of population in county c that is served 
by water district w.  This yields a rough approximation of a county-week time series of 
population exposure to violations, which when multiplied by the first two terms yields an 
estimate of weekly county expenditures in response to violations.  We sum this across all 
counties and time periods to yield the total expenditures for the entire nation.   
Clearly these estimates involves several unverifiable assumptions, namely that 1) our 
estimated responses to violations from Northern California and Nevada are representative of 
                                                            
6 We adjust this coefficient by multiplying it by the exponent of the mean squared residual divided by two to 
account for Jensen’s inequality. 9 
 
changes throughout the country and at all bottled water retailers, and 2) consumption of bottled 
water sales are distributed throughout the year and county as we specify.  Since 61.3 percent of 
all bottled water sales occurred at supermarkets (Datamonitor, 2005), we can scale our estimates 
accordingly if we are concerned that responses at supermarkets are different than responses at 
other retail establishments.  Beyond that, there is unfortunately little more we can do with the 
data at hand.  It nonetheless provides a useful starting point for discussing policy implications 
from water quality violations.   
Our estimates indicate that, in 2005, people spent $11.34 million in response to 
microorganism violations, $1.77 million in response to nitrate violations, and $47.15 million in 
response to element/chemical violations.  These estimates likely represents a lower bound of the 
true costs of avoidance behavior because it does not include other responses to violations, such 
as purchasing alternative beverages (e.g. juice), other actions people may have taken (e.g. boiling 
water), and more permanent responses (e.g. installing water filters).   
IV. Discussion  
This paper builds upon a nascent literature that examines the impacts of informational 
approaches to environmental regulation (Mansfield et al., 2006; Shimshack, Ward, and Beatty 
2007; Neidell, 2009) to examine responses to warnings about drinking water violations.  Unlike 
Shimshack, Ward, and Beatty (2007), who find a broad response to mercury warnings regardless 
of vulnerability, our work provides some evidence for a differentiated response across 
consumers.  Neidell’s (2009) examination of responses to smog alerts finds some evidence of a 
differentiated response based on vulnerabilities, but like Shimshack, Ward, and Beatty (2007) 
does not assess the costs of avoidance behavior.  Mansfield, Johnson, and van Houtven (2006) 
rely on stated preference methods to provide estimates of the costs of avoidance behavior for 10 
 
children in response to high ozone-pollution days.
7  Our work combines features of each of 
these, but adds a considerable innovation by using market-based responses to information to 
provide estimates of avoidance costs.  Moreover, unlike many other forms of pollution, drinking 
water quality violations are quite common.  As a result, our estimates are quite large – US 
consumers paid nearly $60 million in response to water violations in 2005 alone.   
  Even if bottled water purchases captured most of the behavioral response to violations, 
this figure clearly understates the willingness to pay to avoid water violations because it ignores 
the health consequences faced by those who did not limit their exposure (Harrington and 
Portney, 1987).
8  Since nearly 20 million Americans become ill from consuming drinking water 
contaminated with parasites, bacteria, or viruses each year (Reynolds, Mena, and Gerba, 2008), a 
complete measure of willingness to pay would be considerably larger.  Of course, the value of 
avoiding violations must be compared to the costs of eliminating them.
9   Assessing the costs of 
violations reductions and how they vary across water systems is an important direction for future 
research.   
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Table 1. Number and mean duration of violations, November 2001- November 2005 
 
 US  Our  sample 
  # of violations  duration (days)  # of violations  duration (days) 
microorganism  37,645  44.7 239 36.9 
nitrates 3,798  153.9  25  65.7 
elements/chemicals  13,261  131.5 21 223.2 
 
 
Table 2. Community characteristics by violation frequency 
 high  low  p-value 
average weekly sales of bottled water ($)  3,500  4,227  0.00 
median house price ($)  220,362  284,499  0.00 
median household income ($)  49,120  55,820  0.00 
population density  391  1442  0.00 
% white, not Hispanic  70.89  74.83  0.03 
% less than high school degree  17.68  13.05  0.00 
% high school degree only  60.95  55.07  0.00 
% college educated  21.37  31.88  0.00 
% population under age 5  0.06  0.06  0.01 
% population over age 65  0.12  0.14  0.00 
January maximum temperature (F)  54.71  54.57  0.83 
July maximum temperature (F)  84.71  87.05  0.03 
January precipitation (cm)  0.26  0.29  0.03 
July precipitation (cm)  0.00  0.00  0.51 
microorganism violations  9.12  2.31  0.00 
nitrates violations  2.06  0.08  0.00 
elements/chemicals violations  1.46  0.10  0.00 
observations 277  255   
Notes: “high (low)” violations defined as being above (below) than the median number of 
violations for the time period studied. “p-value” is from a t-test for the difference in values 
across the two columns. 
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Table 3. Cross-sectional and fixed effect estimates of water violations on bottled water 
 1  2 
Panel A. Dependent variable = log(sales)  
Microorganism -1.031  0.219 
 [0.666]  [0.076]** 
Nitrates -14.652  0.257 
 [12.403]  [0.587] 
Elements/chemicals 0.533  0.174 
 [1.050]  [0.060]** 
Panel B. Dependent variable = log(price index)  
Microorganism -0.012  -0.011 
 [0.008]  [0.007] 
Nitrates -0.025  -0.052 
 [0.067]  [0.095] 
Elements/chemicals -0.007  -0.011 
 [0.016]  [0.020] 
Fixed effects  N  Y 
Observations 41534  41534 
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered on both water district 
and store in brackets. All regressions controls for year-week indicators, average weekly 
minimum and maximum temperature, and average weekly precipitation. Regressions in column 
2 include store-water district fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 4. Heterogeneity of estimates of water violations on bottled water 
 1  2  3 
  Lowest Quartile  Top Quartile  p-value of 
difference 
Panel A. Household Income      
Bugs 0.2492**  0.1811**  0.225 
 [0.079]  [0.060]   
Nitrates -0.6888  0.7751*  0.458 
 [1.842]  [0.363]   
Elements 0.2714**  1.6893**  0.001 
 [0.047]  [0.464]   
      
Panel B. Percent Over 65      
Bugs 0.1391**  0.3139**  0.026 
 [0.044]  [0.067]   
Nitrates 3.4816  -2.3178  0.261 
 [2.333]  [2.910]   
Elements 0.4602**  0.2805**  0.009 
 [0.100]  [0.036]   
      
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. See notes to Table 3.  